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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
{~1{~\XT Sl-.OT'l., HASI.d\:\1, 
Plaintiff and L1}J]Jcllant, 
YS. 
} 1 £\lTI .. }">i\ULSEN, P. H. P1\UL-
SEX. ~\Nl) BYRON PAl~LSEN 
dba .. \l,~II~: CRANE RENTAL Case No. 
l,():\1 11 i\X\T, HYRUM PETER- 9938 
SEX, 'rHE CORPORATION OJi-, 
'fi-lE PRESIDING BISHOP OF 
'ri-IE l-. H U R C H OF JESUS 
C'HlliST OF L r\ T T ER-DA Y 
S .. \ I X' r S, a corporation sole, and 
l 1,l{i\Xl( L~OTTRELL, 
Defendants and Respondents . 
.t\1 1 PEI~I .. i\X'r'S REPL 1_'" TO RESPONDEN'"fS' 
BRIEF 
REPLl"'" TO RESPONDENTS' STATE:\IENT 
OF FACTS 
Respondents indicate that appellant's staten1ent 
of facts are ''incomplete and merely show the facts and 
i~sues as the appellant contends them to be and not as 
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they. were necessarily viewed by the trial court". They 
then proceed to state the facts as they see them .. 
~.. Our only comment on this is that inasmuch as the 
jury found the issues in appellant's favor and inasmuch 
as there is ample evidence to support every material fact 
set forth and documented in appellant's brief, appellant 
'vas and is entitled to view the_ evidence in a light most 
favorable to appellant, whereas respondents are not 
entitled to this privilege. And in view of the great weight 
of evidence in favor-of appellant's view of the facts aud 
of the paucity or complete absence of any real evidence 
to support the allegations of respondents where they 
conflict with the facts as set forth by appellant, the trial 
court likewise is precluded from asserting its view: where 
that view is contrary to the jury's findings. 
All t~hrough the trial and even now in their brief 
respondents have minimized and do now minimize 
plaintiff's injuries in spite of the solid and weighty evi-
dence pertaining thereto. The jury believed plaintiff's 
evidence and they were not caught up in respondents' 
light-hearted treatment of plaintiff's damages. For 
example, even now defendants still talk as if they are 
not a'Yare of the fact that plaintiff's pain, which is per-
manent, is not a result of an inflamed bursa, and that 
it "ras the inflamed bursa only which the operation was 
able to correct-and did correct. But the other shoulder 
damage is beyond repair, of which fact respondents ap-
pear to be quite unaware. 
Other illustrations might be given of respondents' 
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refusal to sec the fncts as seen by the jury, but \Ve \viii 
l'ontcnt oursel,·es 'vith the request that the court Yie'v 
the evidence as related in appellant's brief, and that 
where there is any conflict of evidence as to material 
facts as set forth respectiYely by the parties, such facts 
should be resolved in favor of the appellant and as 
found hy the jury. 
l{El>L\r 'fO RESPONDEN'fS' POINT I 
'fhere is nothing in Article 8, Section 9 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, nor in Rule 7:2, 
w hieh \vould preclude this court from deciding this 
ease at this time if the court finds that the trial court 
a bused its discretion. Our discussion of this point is 
found under Point I, ... of appellant's brief and in our 
l{eply to Respondents' Point IX herein. Until the 
trial court abuses its discretion, it may retain control 
of the case by a ne\v trial order from which an appeal 
Ina y not be in order. But an abuse of discretion is an-
other Inatter and this court has not shrunk from giving 
relief from such rulings. 
l{espondents make a point of our failure to state 
in our brief that appellant ,s petition for an interlocutory 
appeal in this case \vas denied. In the petition "?e re-
ferred to the fact that "?e \Vere filing an appeal, and 
"·e believe that it is a fair inference that this court 
denied the petition for the reason that it would have a 
better opportunity to consider the case more thoroughly 
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"\vhen reviewed under the usual appeal procedure. It 
did not occur to us that a reference in our appeal brief 
to the other procedure was of any consequence, or that 
thereby we would be advising the court as to something 
of which it was not already aware. 
Respondents then quote from the case of National 
Farmers Union Property and Casualty Company vs. 
'fhon1pson ( 1955), 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 Pac. 2d, 249, as 
follows: 
"An order granting a new trial is different in 
character than an order denying one. 1,he latter 
terminates the cause, while the former operates 
to vacate the judgment and reinstate the case 
as one undisposed of before the court, and over 
which the court retains jurisdiction." 
In the Farmers Union case the trial judge, after 
jury verdict and judgment in favor of defendant per-
mitting defendant to retain $2,000.00 paid him by the 
plaintiff insurance company for fire loss to a frame 
building, entered a conditional order to the effect that 
a new trial be granted unless the defendant, within ten 
days, filed· his consent to reduce the amount of $2000.00 
so allowed by the jury to $1000.00, which the judge 
said was the value of the building' as found by him. The 
defendant did not consent to the reduction and moved 
to set aside the conditional order. Five months after 
the 1notion 'vas argued, the trial judge vacated the order 
for a new trial and reinstated the judgment and restored 
the jury finding of $2000.00 as the value of the build-
Ing. The plaintiff insurance company then challenged 
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t.his n•storative aetion of the court on the theory that 
once the trial court granted a ne\V trial, it "·as po,ver-
less to vncnte such an order. 
1 ~u t this court held that the trial court could vacate 
its order bceause it \Vas vacating an order yrantiny a 
new trial ,vhil'h \vas different in that factual setting 
front an order dcn,IJing a new trial. 
'rhe real difference, however, upon a careful read-
ing of the case, is that while an order granting a ne"' 
trial is different from an order denying a new trial in 
that one n1ust appeal from the latter if he seeks relief, 
this does not tnean that one ~null/ not a peal from an order 
granting a ne\\· trial "·here, in granting the ne\v trial, 
the court abused its discretion. 
IlEI~LY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT II 
.t\ll that respondents say in Point II of their brief 
Is pretnised upon the idea that some minor injuries 
suffered by appellant in 1957 had a relationship to the 
bursa infianunation in plaintiff's shoulder, which Dr. 
Pen1berton corrected by surgery. To keep this problem 
in its proper perspective \Ve here emphasize that the 
bursa injury is not the injury 'vhich has caused plain-
tiff's partial pern1anent disability. ''r e deal 'vith this 
n1atter under Point II of our brief on pages 35-38. 
Because plaintiff, in the medical history given Dr. 
J>etuberton, did not refer to these 1957 incidents, which 
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occurred well over two years prior to the January 19, 
1960, accident, the respondents catalog the medical his-
tory as untrue. 'fhere is not the slightest evidence that 
either incident in 1957 resulted in any damage or pain 
whatsoever except for a day or two of discomfort at the 
time they occurred. Yet, unless one assumes, contrary to 
all the evidence in the Inatter, that plaintiff had pain and 
discomfort for over two years either intermittently or 
continuously up to the time of the January 19, 1960. 
accident, there could be no possible reason for plaintiff 
referring to such inconsequential events in giving a 
medical history of his January 19, 1960, accident. 
In atte1npting to reduce the facts to a choice of 
uncertain probabilities as to the cause of the bursa 
inflammation, respondents observe that none of the 
doctors could say when plaintiff received his inflamed 
bursa, independent of plaintiff's statements to them. It 
is true that any doctor would have to rely on what the 
appellant said. But respondents don't want to rely 
on what he said and they don't want the doctors to rely 
on what he said. He said the 1957 incidents left no 
damage and no pain, that within a day or two these 
injuries were all healed and cleared up and that he had 
no pain or suffering whatsoever until the accident of 
January 19, 1960. The origin of plaintiff's pain was 
January 19, 1960, and it was therefore this accident 
and the pains incident thereto that he described to Dr. 
Pemberton. Dr. Pemberton believed this accident to be 
the source of plaintiff's pain, and at the time of the 
trial he still believed it. Dr. Pemberton not only related 
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the s pecifit· injury of the inflamed bursa to the January 
IH, IUHO, accident but he found that accident to be the 
soun·e of nll of plaintiff's injuries in the region of his 
shoulder. 
Iti~:I)L \T 'fO RESPONDEN'1'S' POIN'"f III 
Our treatment of this subject is found under Point 
III of our brief beginning at Page 39. 
\ \'" e do observe, however, that here again respond-
ents, in ref erring to the medical history, state that 
''this \vas found not to be true". Found by whom? 
Certainly not the jury. The record does not reveal it. 
It is found only in the minds of the respondents. And 
'rhen respondents say that appellant himself person-
nlly did all the 'vork on his home remodelling, they ig-
nore the record. The evidence is that he helped a little, 
nnrl only as much as his disabled arm and shoulder 
pern1itted, and that he did this work for the very pur-
JH lsr of giYing his arm and shouder the exercise neces-
sary to redeYelop and reactivate them from the disuse 
and atrophy resulting from the operation. 
REPLl"'" 'fO RESPOXDENTS' POINT , ... 
In Yie'v of the record and of the remarks of the 
trial judge during arguments on the motion for a new 
trial there can be no question that the trial judge con-
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sistently rejected respondents' view that work1nen's 
compensation was plaintiff's exclusive remedy. Never-
theless, respondents have raised the issue here, and the 
reply which follows is offered for this court's considera-
tion in the event it decides to consider and pass upon 
respondents' Point V. 
The facts of the case as they pertain to this issue 
are reviewed as follows: 
On January 19, 1960, plaintiff was an employee of 
Utah Sand and Gravel Company. He was a truck 
driver whose job was to deliver ready-mix cement to 
the locations provided by his employer. The employer's 
establishment is located in North Salt Lake on Beck 
Street, where the truck receives the ready-mix. On the 
date in question, the plaintiff was dispatched by his 
en1ployer with a load of ready-mix cement to be de-
livered to the L.D.S. Church at Wasatch Boulevard 
and 13th South, where the Church was erecting a new 
chapel. To assist the Church in conveying the cement 
from the truck to the place where it was being used 
for the foundation of the building, the Church .had 
contracted with Acme Crane Rental Company to fur-
nish a crane and a crane operator for such purpose. 
When the plaintiff drove upon the building site at 
approximately I :00 p.m. of said day, the crane was in 
the process of unloading the ready-mix truck just ahead 
of the plaintiff's truck ":hich consisted of the cement 
being poured from the truck into the crane bucket and 
then from the crane bucket after it had been lifted to 
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the point \vhere the l~hureh foreman or his helpers 
ind.icuted the <Tinent should be poured. After the truck 
ahead of hint had pulled away the plaintiff then backed 
his truck up to the crane bucket for the purpose of 
unloading in the sa1ne way and manner as the previous 
truek. 
1.,here are thus three separate employers involved 
in this operation: 'fhe Church, the Acme Crane Rental 
Cornpany. and the Utah Sand and Gravel Company. 
In spite of the facts, respondents claim, in con-
tcnlplation of the applicable statutes, that plaintiff and 
~\cn1e l""rane Rental Company were employees of the 
l~hurch and, therefore, plaintiff's only remedy against 
either the Church or Acme is that which is provided 
by \vorkn1en's compensation. The record shows that 
plaintiff's counsel represents the State Insurance Fund 
in this case to the extent of its subrogation rights from 
plaintiff against respondents. ( R. 186) . 
SEl'1.TIOX 35-1-.t2 WAS NEVER INTEND-
}~D TO BE. XOR IS IT, A GUIDE TO THE IN-
TEl~I)RE1.,..:\'fiOX OF 35-1-62, U.C.A. 1953. 
Section 35-1-62 reads in part as follows: "When 
any injury * * * for \Yhich compensation is payable 
under this title shall have been caused by the wrongful 
act or neglect of another person not in the same em-
ployiuent, the injured employee, * * * may claim com-
prn~ation and the injured employee * * * may also 
haYe an action for dan1ages against such third person.'' 
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The phrase "not in the same employment" found in 
the above is limited to employees of the same employer 
in the restrictive sense of the term and is not to be con-
fused with the more liberal definition of employer as 
found in 35-1-42 as expressed in the following excerpts: 
"Regularly employed in the satne business, or 
in or about the same establishment under any 
contract of hire"; 
"The term 'regularly' as herein used shall in-
clude all employments in the usual course of the 
trade, business, profession or occupation of the 
employer, whether continuous throughout the 
year or for only a portion of the year"; 
"Where any employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor 
over whose work he retains supervision or con-
trol, and such work is a part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer, such contrac-
tor,and all persons employed by him, and all sub-
contractors under him, and all persons employed 
by any such subcontractors, shall be deemed, 
within the meaning of this section, employees of 
such original employer." 
35-1-42 was enacted io prevent the evasion of the 
Act by many -employers who parcel out, under guise 
of contracts, the work among many so-called contractors 
while retaining supervision and control of the work. 
It was legislation to prev~nt employers from defeating 
the A.ct by reducing through a subterfuge the amount 
of employees covered by the Act. See Angel et al vs. 
Industrial C.ommission of Utah, 64 Utah 105. 
10 
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;),)-1-~;~ \ras enacte<l for the purpose of per1nitting 
suit n.~ninst a third party tortfeasor \\·ho 'vas not the 
in.i ured party's actual e1nployer (using the term enl-
ployer here in its usual connotation and not inthe more 
general use as defined in 35-1-42) and who had no re-
sponsibility to carry workmen's compensation for the 
injurc<l party. In such a case 35-1-62 seeks to make 
\':hole the insurance company's loss as well as to retain 
the con1n1on la'v rights of suit by the injured party. 
Inusrnueh as these two sections deal with separate and 
unrelated problems, it would be contrary to the rules of 
lcg·islatiYe interpretation to construe the sections as one. 
On the occasions "·hen 35-1-62 have been before 
this C'ourt, it has been made plain that this section 
\ras not to be interpreted in a restrictive sense so as to 
defeat the legislative intent. See Johanson vs. Cudahy 
Packing C'o., 107 Utah 114, 152 Pac. 2nd 98. Also, 
l~ogalski Ys. Phillips Petroleum Co., 3 Utah 2nd 203. 
In the latter case, the issue \vas raised as to whether the 
State Insurance Fund had to be joined as a necessary 
party plaintiff. In considering the matter, the court said: 
'~.L-\ppellant claims that U.C.A., 1953, 35-1-62, 
n1ust be interpreted to give the sole right of 
action to the insurance carrier after the carrier 
has paid compensation and cites the language of 
the statute: ' * * * The employer or insurance 
carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party and may bring and main-
tain the action either in its own name or in the 
name of the insured employee'. Certainly~ this 
language does give the insurance carrier a right 
11 
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of action, but it Wa8 not meant to abrogate the 
language preceding this quotation which pro-
vides_, ~when any injury or death for which com-
pensation is payable under this title shall have 
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another * * * the injured employee * * * may 
also have an action for damages against such 
third person"'."'"' (Our emphasis). 
It is instructive to note the fact situation in this 
case. The plaintiff was an employee of the third party's 
distributing agent. And the accident happened while 
the plaintiff was on the third party's premises washing 
his employer's truck which carried the third party's 
name, trade marks and colors, and while using the third 
party's truck cleaning facilities. In spite of all this 
chain of agency and community of interest the court 
emphasizes that 35-1-62 granted plaintiff the right to 
sue such third party. In the Johanson case, above cited, 
the court stated that it was not the legislative purpose 
in the enactment of this section to create a shield for a 
third party tortfeasor. It was not intended to limit or 
proscribe the liability of such a wrongdoer. It was 
designed to permit an employer or insurance carrier 
who pays compensation in accordance with the act to 
participate in the recovery had from the third party 
tortfeasor, the participation being limited to the amount 
of compenstaion paid, plus the cost of collecting fro1n 
the wrongdoer. And the only concern of the third party 
is that he be effectively protected against double suit 
for the same wrong, that is to say, that the suit be 
brought in the name of the real party in interest and 
12 
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that all those haYing an interest in the subject n1atter 
of the litigation be bound by the judgment. 
I>J .. \IX'r II~,I~, IS NOT AN E~II>LOYEE 01~, 
~\X\'" <>I,~ 'rilE l)EFEND1\NTS E\'"EN Blr THE 
~~~ll)LO\'"Elt-E:\II>I~O\~EE S'fANDARDS 011, 
35-1-1:! • \X ll a~3-I-.ta, U.C.A., 1953. 
\\'" e ,rish no\v to apply the standards of the em-
ployer-exnployee relationship as defined in 35-1-4:! and 
a.)-1-4:3 to the plaintiff and show thereby that even 
under those standards, the plaintiff is not an employee 
of either of the defendants. 
'fhe real test as to \vhether a person is an employee 
under the standards of 35-1-42 is this: Does the em-
ployer supervise and control the employee's work as 
to the xnanner of the work or how it is to be performed~ 
In the case before the court the work of mixing concrete 
is done at l ... tah Sand and Gravel yards at North Salt 
l~ake. The plaintiff comes and goes to job sites as a 
truek driYer as he is directed, supervised and controlled 
hy his O\vn etnployer, the Utah Sand and Gravel Com-
pany . ..:\ t the defendant's job site in this case, the plain-
tiff\ duty. as usual 'vhen delivering cement, was solely 
to deliYer the ready-mix and then leave. ''That the 
defendants did with the cement and how they went 
about using it "·as of no concern to plaintiff. And, the 
Chureh's only concern was that the cement be up to 
specifications or that it conform to what was ordered. 
Ho,\· lTtah Sand and Gravel acquired the material or 
th~ir manner and method of mixing it, or ho'v they 
13 
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delivered it and unloaded it into the crane bucket pro-
vided for such purpose was of no concern to the Church. 
All it was concerned about was that at a certain ti1ne 
and a certain place a certain mixture be placed in a 
bucket which they provided. The fact is, in this case, 
that there was not anyone associated with any of the 
defendants around to say or do or make any comment 
as to ho"v plaintiff went about the job of dumping the 
cement into the crane bucket. 
Furthermore, plaintiff qualifies as an "independent 
contractor" as defined in 35-1-42, which specifically 
relieves him of an employee relationship with either 
the Crane Company or the Church by the standards, 
extensive as they are, of that section. Representing his 
own employer, the Utah Sand and Gravel Company, 
plaintiff was "engaged only in the performance of a 
definite job or piece of work" in seeing that the cement 
that was ordered was delieverd to the job. Such process 
of delivery was "subordinate to the employer only in 
effecting a result in accordance with the employer's 
design"and he was "independent of the employer in all 
that pertains to the execution of the work" and he was 
"not subject to the rule or control of the employer." 
No one among the defendants gave plaintiff or any of 
his fellow truck drivers at Utah Sand and Gravel any 
instructions, and none were in order or appropriate, 
for their job upon reaching the construction site 'vas 
tnerely to dump the cement into the bucket. 
In no way can it be said that plaintiff was engaged 
in common employment with either the employees of 
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the defendant. l:rane l~on1pany. or the defendant, the 
Chureh .. \" bet,veen the Church and the Crane Cotn-
pnny. their etnployees did, in fact, have a degree of 
t•lo'-ieness in their relationship. They conferred as to 
what they should do, and as found as a matter of law 
hy the trial court, there was no employer-employee rela-
tionship bet,veen them just as there was none as between 
the plaintiff and either of the defendants. 
'riiJ1~ 1{11:-L\L MEANING AND EFFECT OF 
a.>-1-42, U.C.A. 1953. 
1\n etnployer as defined in the .1\.ct must secure 
l'Oillpensation for his employees in one of three ways 
as set forth in 35-1-45. That is, an employer 1nust secure 
rotnpensation for his employees as the term employee is 
defined in 35-1-43. 35-1-42 does not require a sub-
contractor of the e1nployer to insure such employer's 
etnployees. 'fhe subcontractor in such a job site situation 
is not the "'etnployer" and therefore does not enjoy the 
inuuunity from suit by an employee that the "employer" 
enjoys. 1,he purpose of defining employer to include 
employees of a subcontractor as provided in 35-1-42 
''"as to protect the compensation rights of employees. 
It "·as not intended to relieve subcontractors of their 
eonuuon la"· responsibilities. Therefore, when in 35-1-
60 "·e read that an employee's right to compensation is 
his exrlusiYe right against his employer and his em-
ployer"s officers, agents or other employees, we are to 
,~.dYe the usual or common la"" meaning to such terms. 
i\n e1uployer's "officers", "agents", and "employees" 
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as used in 35-1-60 does not include an employer's sub-
contractors. Therefore, 35-1-42 prevents an injured 
employee on a job site, whor has received compensation, 
from suing the principal, or prime contractor or "em-
ployer" because he is not a third party. But a subcon-
tractor on that job may be sued by any employee includ-
ing an employee directly employed by the "employer". 
See Brown vs. Arrington Construction Company, 262 
Pac. 2nd 789 (Idaho) . This case has an excellent dis-
cussion as to this problem. The Utah and Idaho statutes 
are not too dissimilar. ,.fhis case, incidentally, is a case 
that is very similar to the facts of the case now before 
the court with reference to the principles of negligence. 
The facts of that case as they apply to the issue now 
under discussion are dissimilar, however, in that in the 
Idaho case the plaintiff was employed by the "employer" 
and was suing a subcontractor of the "employer" even 
though the employer directed the work of the subcon-
tractor, whereas, in this case plaintiff is not an em-
ployee of the "employer" but is an employee of a busi-
ness visitor who was entirely independent of the "em-
ployer". Nevertheless, the Idaho court permitted the 
suit, saying the subcontarctor was a third party in spite 
of the fact that the plaintiff and defendant subcon-
tractor were in "common employment". 
THE CASES CITED IN DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM ARE NOT APPLICABLE 
'1.,0 THIS CASE. 
,.fhe treatment that is given to the rights of plain-
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tiffs to sue third parties after such plaintiffs have re-
ceived industrial eo1npensation vary considerably among 
the states, so much so that it is essential that each 
stutute be checked carefully before citing cases to sup-
port an interpretation of a statute in another state. 
'ehe first case that respondents cite is Murray v-s. 
\Vnsatch Grading Company (1929), 73 Utah 430, 274 
P:!d H40 . ..c\s noted by respondents' comments the facts 
are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. The 
defendant in that case had borrowed an employee of 
the Railroad Company. Although the employee's pay 
cante from the Railroad Company, that Company was 
reitnbursed for the wage by defendant. The plaintiff 
etnployee was doing and generally engaged in the work 
of' defendant. The court makes this very clear when it 
says: 
"The plaintiff when injured was working un-
der an express contract of hire, and was engaged 
in the usual course of the business or occupation 
of the defendant. According to plaintiff's testi-
mony, he was engaged in placing a chain around 
a large rock so that a team driven by one of 
defendant's employees could remove the same 
from the railroad track, when another tea1n 
driven by another employee of the defendant so 
moved a telephone pole that it rolled against 
plaintiff's leg and caused the injury complained 
of. It was the duty of the defendant to keep the 
railroad track clear-that "·as its business or oc-
cupation. The plaintiff. at the time of his injury, 
was engaged in that business or occupation. Ob-
,·iously, if the plaintiff had sought compensation 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the 
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defendant would have been without any defense 
under the facts as shown by this record." 
Respondent next cites the Oregon case of Pruett 
vs. Lininger (1960), 224 Ore. 614, 356 P2d 547. 
Here again the plaintiff was an employee of the 
general contractor or "employer". The third party 
defendant owned and operated the crane which also 
supplied the ready-mix concrete and had been hired 
by the general contractor. Therefore, the fact situation 
does not correspond with the case at bar. Under the 
fact situation of the Pruett case the Oregon statute 
quoted in the opinion clearly prevented the plaintiff 
from suing the Crane Company as a third party. The 
Oregon statute applicable reads in part: 
O.R.S. 656.154 
'' (I) If the injury to a workman is due to the 
negligence or wrong of a third person not in the 
same employ, the injured workman, * * * may 
elect to seek a remedy against such third person. 
However, no action shall be brought against any 
such third person if he or his workman causing 
the injury was, at the time of the injury, on 
premises over which he had joint supervision and 
control with the employer of the injured work-
man and was an employer subject to O.R.S. 
656.002 to 656.590." 
" ( 2) As used in this section, 'premises' means 
the place where the employer or his workm~n 
causing the injury, and the employer of the In-
jured workman, are engaged in the furtherance 
of a common enterprise on the accomplishment 
of the same or related purposes in operation." 
18 
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In the I>ruett case, the employer 'vas a general 
bridge eontractor "·hose employee "·as the plaintiff 
und the plaintiff brought the action against the owner 
of a crane being rented by the plaintiff's employer to 
use in pouring concrete. All were working on the sa1ne 
job and on the same premises 'vhen the accident oc-
curred. 'fhe court said: 
''If the third party causing the injury 'vas 
negligent, a third party action will lie unless 
barred by O.R.S. 656.154 * * * . If the third 
party causing the injury was negligent, it 'vas 
also covered by the workmen's compensation act, 
which is the situation now before the court, a 
third party action authorized by O.R.S. 656.15-J. 
is nevertheless available unless the two employees 
were engaged in the performance of component 
parts of an undertaking on premises occupied 
by the workmen of both covered employers". 
Thus, the facts of that case do not correspond 
'vith the case now before the court, and the Oregon 
statute specifically prevents a third party suit in that 
fact situation. 'fhat case is therefore dissimilar as to 
both the facts and the law when applied to the instant 
ease. 
'fhe next case cited by respondents is the Idaho 
rase of Cloughley vs. Orange 'Transportation Company 
( 1958), 80 Idaho 226, 327 P2d 369. The facts in this 
case are dissimilar from the facts of the case at bar for 
the follo,ving reasons: 
(I) The driver in the Idaho case was in fact loaned 
as a temporary employee of the "employer" and did 
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in fact receive directions and was controlled by and was 
under the supervision of the superintendent of the 
"employer". 
( 2) The temporary loaning of the driver to the 
"employer" was done pursuant to a custo1n and a rule 
of the carriers association approved by the ICC, 'rhich 
-provided that where large and heavy equipment, such 
as was involved in that case, was loaded and unloaded, 
such loading or unloading was performed by the ship-
per or consignee as the case may be. The plaintiff in 
that case was an employee of the "employer" and he 
was suing the truck driver. We thus have a true situa-
tion of common employment which does not come within 
the facts and principles of the case at bar nor come 
within the facts and principles involved in the Idaho 
case of Brown vs. Arrington Construction Company 
above cited. 
Respondents then refer to the Massachusetts case 
of McPadden vs. W. J. Halloran Company (1958), 
338 Mass. 189, 154 NE 2d 582. 
'l,his Massachusetts case is one where the plaintiff 
"~as an employee of the same company which had 
e1nployed the Stafford Iron Works to do certain "work 
for it". Thus, there was a true common employee situ-
ation. The Stafford Iron Works was doing work for 
the "employer" of the plaintiff, who was also an em-
ployee of the "employer". Such facts are clearly 
distinguished fro1n the case at bar. 
The next case cited by defendant Is Sutton rs. 
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lrulustriall,omtnission of Utah, 9 lTtah 2nd 339, where 
the fut·ts are obviously not applicable to the case before 
the court. 
'l'he next case cited by defendant is Plewe Con-
struction l~otnpauy vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
1~1 Utah 375, which is another case where the "etn-
ployer, exercised supervision and control over the 
\rork done by the person seeking industrial compen-
sation. It should be noted that all of the Utah cases 
cited above by defendants were cases where the party 
involved 'vas seeking industrial compensation by bring-
ing action against the Industrial Commissior1. Also, 
these cases involved an interpretation of 35-1-42. The 
issue in those cases generally involve the problem of 
'"hether the general contractor exercised supervision 
and control over an employee of a subcontractor. 
Our objection to the cases cited by respondents is 
sintply that they involve fact premises and in some in-
stances la,vs which are neither similar or applicable to 
the facts and circumstances of the case now before 
the court. 
REPL l~ TO RESPONDENTS' POINT VI 
Under this point respondents examine only the 
first t'vo special interrogatories and answers, and isolate 
them from the other special questions and answers. 
Before we point out the nature of respondents' 
errors in their analysis of the special verdict, we wish 
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to comment on these special interrogatories as a ,vhole. 
''r e believe-and we feel sure the trial judge agrees-
that in a calmer and more deliberate atmosphere than 
1vas present during the formulation of these interroga-
tories, a better job could have been done and the jury's 
task could have been made easier. We believe there 
was, indeed, room for improvement. Nevertheless, these 
questions and answers, when looked at as a whole leave 
no doubt as to the following findings by the jury: 
1. 'fhat respondents proximately caused plaintiff's 
InJUries. 
2. 'l,hat plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. 
3. That plaintiff was damaged in the amount of the 
verdict rendered. 
Now as to Interrogatory 1: 
"I. ''r as the defendant, Hyrun1 Peterson, negligent 
in the placing or operation of the crane immediately 
before or at the actual time of the accident in this case? 
Answer: Yes." 
There is no dispute in the evidence that Peterson 
placed and operated the crane immediately before and 
at the actual time of the accident in this case. Since there 
\vas no dispute as to these matters and since the evidence 
is an1ple on all points there should be no question that 
the jury-all of the 1nembers thereof- answered all 
points in the affirmative even though the various ele-
Inents 'vere placed in the disjunctive. 
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The second question was: 
''l)id the negligence of Hyrum Petersen proxi-
111ately cause, or participate in causing the accident and 
injury of \vhich plaintiff complains? Answer: Yes." 
~o\r, as far as a judgment against Petersen and 
his employer is concerned it makes no difference whether 
his negligence was the sole cause or a concurring cause. 
~ \.nd '"hen the jury answered "yes" to this question, 
the respondents cannot avoid liability even though the 
jury could have had in mind that the defendant Church 
also proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. 
Other answers that also bring certainty to the mind 
th:t t respondents are liable proximately as found by the 
jury are the answers to interrogatories 7a, 8, 10, and 11. 
7a reads: ''Under all the facts and circumstances 
of this case, was plaintiff Haslam guilty of negligence? 
..c-\.ns,ver: No." 
8 reads: "If, in your answers to this point you have 
found that defendant Petersen or plaintiff Haslam was 
guilty of negligence \Yhich proximately caused or con-
tributed to the injury plaintiff received, would the acci-
dent not have happened except for said negligence? 
(Put a cross in the box that fits your answer)." 
The ans,ver was: ''Yes, it would not have hap-
pened''. Thus, with Haslam excluded as a contributing 
party to the negligence, Petersen alone, along with his 
ernployer, is left as the one who proximately caused 
plaintiff's injuries. 
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Then with the further action of rendering a verdict 
in a sum certain against respondents and in favor of 
the plain tiff as found in ans,vers I 0 and II, there is no 
room for_ doubt, not even, we believe, in the minds of 
respondents. 
We think it appropriate here to quote from a state-
ment of this court in Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District vs. Nelson, II Utah 2d 253: 
"Presumptions and intendments cannot be 
indulged in to establish a contradiction or incon-
sistency in the findings or answers of a jury to 
special interrogatories, the presumption being 
always to the contrary." 
Finally we register objection to respondents' state-
ment that one of the reasons the court granted a new 
trial was because it believed it had erred in the wording 
of the interrogatories. This, we believe, is not only an 
incorrect assumption but is contrary to anything in the 
record and is not premised upon any expression by the 
trial judge off the record in the presence of counsel for 
appellant. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT VII 
Respondents here attack the court's instruction No. 
7, claiining that they have been adversely affected there-
by. Our discussion on this matter is found on pp. 26-29 
and 43-44 of our brief. 
''r e should point out here, however, that the court 
did not use the phrase "wanton or wilfuln as stated by 
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respo11dcnts. ,.fhe phrasing used is "wanton or reckless/' 
or sirnply "reckless". 
l t should also, perhaps, be emphasized that this 
subject is nO\\' moot inas1nuch as the jury found plain-
tiff not to be contributorily negligent and because 
plaintiff did not ask for and the court did not give any 
instruction as to punitive damages. The only argument 
that appellant's counsel made to the jury was that if 
the jury should determine that defendants' conduct 
was wanton or reckless according to the definition set 
forth in Instruction 7, then defendants could not assert 
the defense of contributory negligence. We submit 
that such an argument would not and did not "inflame 
the jury'' as respondents here claim. 
REPL , .. 1"0 RESPONDENTS' POINT VIII 
That plaintiff was not contributorily negligent is 
discussed in appellant's brief at pp. 18-26 with a sum-
mary of the matter at pp. 24-26. 
Ho,vever, we urge most strongly our exception to 
respondents' statement that one of the reasons the trial 
judge granted a new trial was because he believed the 
e,·idence was such that plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law or that the verdict in this 
respect \Vas against the weight of the evidence. Nothing 
in the record or in the court's expressions off the record 
justify such a conclusion. 
If there is any truth in the theory that this was a 
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reason for the court's order of a new trial, then our 
position that the court abused its discretion would be 
further enhanced. In view of the evidence and of the 
business invitee position of plaintiff, there is a very 
plausible view that plaintiff was not contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law, and it is inconceivable 
that the trial court would impose its own judgment 
over the jury's findings on this point. 
Even so, the issue of contributory negligence is 
also moot in view of the jury's specific finding of de-
fendant's wanton and reckless conduct. If this court 
agrees with us that the evidence warranted an instruc-
tion as to the matter of reckless and wanton conduct 
of the plaintiff, then contributory negligence is no 
defense to plaintiff's action since the jury found that 
defendants' conduct was wanton and reckless. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' POINT IX 
Our views on the subject of this court's right to 
consider this case at this time and that what the trial 
court did in vacating the judgment and granting a new 
trial "·as action 'vhich is appealable to this court is set 
forth in pp. 44-48 of our brief. 
However, we wish here to analyze respondents' 
authorities and show thereby that they do not support 
their contention and that, in fact, they in some instances 
really support our view of the matter. 
'l,hey cite Beck vs. Dutchman Coalition Mines 
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Con1pany (IU."J~). :! l Ttah ~d 104, ~09 P2d 867, to the 
t•H'ct·t that trial eourts have "ride latitude in granting or 
denying tnotions for new trials, a point \vith which we 
ugrt'e. But there is a litnit to a trial court's latitude. In 
thnt (.'ase a jury rendered a verdict in plaintiff's favor of 
~l.jOO.OO against defendant for attorney's fees. He was 
not satisfied 'vith the amount and his motion for a new 
trinl 'rns denied. There was evidence in the record which 
supported the jury's verdict, and there was also evi-
dence \vhich would have supported a fee of a larger 
a1nount. \\rith these facts the court must conclude, as 
it did. that it had no right to upset the jury's verdict. 
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Henriod said 
that in his opinion the plaintiff's verdict should have 
been n1uch greater in view of the evidence which sup-
ported a greater verdict, even though there was a con-
flil't in the evidence on this point. Said he: 
''But the writer and this court were not and 
cannot pretend to be the jury in this case, and 
our personal feelings in any such matter cannot 
exceed the four corners of the record made." 
Respondents then cite Bowden Ys. Denver and Rio 
(;rande ''r estern Railroad Company ( 1955), 3 Utah 
2d 444, 286 P2d 240, to the effect that a reviewing 
court \viii interfere with the exercise thereof only if 
there is a clear abuse of discretion. Now, this is pre-
cisely 'vhat our position is and we submit that such is 
the state of the case now before the court. 
In the Bo,vdetl case the plaintiff was granted a 
ne'v trial by the trial court and this court did consider 
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the appeal and did reverse the order for a new trial and 
reinstated the judgment. In support of its ne\v tria] 
order the trial court had referred to the "Butz'' case 
' a then recent case, by which it felt bound to grant a 
ne'v trial. This court, in rejecting the applicability of 
that authority, had the following important things to 
say: 
''There is a most important difference between 
this case and the 'Butz' case hereinabove dis-
cussed. In the latter, the trial court had deprived 
the plaintiff of a trial by jury and resolved all 
of the issues of fact against him as a rna tter of 
law, whereas in this case the matter was submitted 
to a jury and the facts were found against the 
plaintiff. We reaffirm our commitment that 'The 
right of a jury trial * * * is * * * a right so funda-
mental and sacred to the citizens [that it] should 
be jealously guarded by the courts'. But once 
having been granted such right and a verdict 
rendered, it should not be regarded lightly nor 
overturned without good and sufficient reason: 
nor should a judgment be disturbed merely be-
cause of error. Only where there is error both 
substantial and prejudicial, and when there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the result would have 
been different without it, should error be regard-
ed as sufficient to upset a judgment or grant 
a new trial". 
Respondents next cite the case of Holmes vs. 
Nelson ( 1958) , 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P2d 722, because 
they are impressed with the fact that this court affirmed 
the granting of a new trial. In that case there was no 
dispute in the evidence, and the evidence was clear as 
to the fact that a 31h-year-old child would never haYe 
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been strtu:k hy defendant's car except for a set of facts 
thnt ineYitably spelled out negligence in the defendant's 
t•onduct. In this ease this court dealt at some length 
with the problern of trial courts ordering new trials. In 
a concurring opinion, l\Ir. Justice Crockett states a 
prinriple 'vhich we believe was violated by the trial judge 
in the case n<nv before the court. He said: 
''The verdict, when supported by substantial 
evidence, should be regarded as presun1ptively 
correct and should not be interferred lvith Inerely 
because the judge might disagree with the result. 
The prerogative should only be exercised when, 
in the view of the trial court, it seems clear that 
the jury has misapplied or failed to take into 
account proven facts; or misunderstood or dis-
regarded the law; or made findings clearly 
against the weight of the evidence so that the 
verdict is offensive to his sense of justice to the 
extent that he cannot in good conscience permit 
it to stand.'' 
Although the foregoing rule would preclude, we 
believe, a trial judge from granting a new trial on the 
record in this case, it is a rule that does not go as far 
in restraining of a trial judge from granting a new trial 
ns does the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Henriod, 
"·ho observes that the majority opinion in the Holmes 
case necessarily holds the defendant was liable as a 
rnatter of law. Otherwise the court has no right to 
interfere "~ith a jury's verdict and order a new trial, for 
he says: 
''If there is another trial and the jury again 
finds no negligence, all that the plaintiff need 
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do is to appeal again to this court, and, under 
the decision here, it would have to be reversed. 
and another trial ordered. This could go on ad 
infinitum until finally a jury would hold for the 
plaintiff. Hence, the plaintiff cannot lose in this 
~as e. It would be more sensible, in my opinion, 
1f the case were sent back for the assess1nent of 
damages only, saying what the main opinion in 
substance and effect has said, that defendant is 
Jjable as a matter of law." 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we submit that every issue of fact 
raised in this case was clearly and unequivocally a ques-
tion for the jury to decide, that every issue of law was 
adequately covered by the trial court's instructions, and 
that if either party was prejudiced by such instructions 
it was certainly not the respondents; that the jury 
acted upon both the issues of fact and law well within 
and reasonably within their exclusive province to act, 
and that, having done so, it is not within the trial court's 
province or powers to retain jurisdiction of the case 
for a new trial; that there are limits to the right of a 
trial court to order a new trial and those limits were 
clearly exceeded by such an order in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PARK SMOOT 
417 Felt Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Grant Scott Haslam 
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l hereby certify that on this -------- day of February, 
196~. I n1ailed two copies of this Brief by United States 
~Iail, postage prepaid, to Raymond M. Berry; two 
copies to George H. Searle; and two copies to Skeen, 
\Yorsley. Snow and Christensen at the addresses shown 
on this Brief. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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